3 Mutua writes: "The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the West . . . Historically, the Third World has generally viewed international law as a regime and discourse of domination and subordination, not resistance and liberation. This broad dialectic of opposition to international law is defined and referred to here as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) leaders have played a role in the pre-World War II period of lawmaking and have used existing cultural and legal traditions to do so. Accounting for this history makes for a more accurate, inclusive, and culturallygrounded approach to the law made by and for states. More pointedly, it reaffirms that cornerstone premise of sovereignty-in all of its diverse national expressions-an idea challenged today by global politicaleconomic forces. 6 In comparative international law, legal history, and Islamic studies, it is fairly well established that Islamic norms historically governing use of force are broadly compatible with principles of the international law of war. Beyond Quranic verses, the classic example is Abu Bakr's instructions to Arab armies invading Syria on the eve of the Ridda wars (632/3 CE) in which the prophet Muhammad's first successor sought to defeat and reintegrate rebellious Arab tribes into the newly-formed Islamic empire or caliphate. 7 In laying out some of the first humanitarian norms-prohibitions against "treachery," pillage, the killing of children, women, the elderly-Abu Bakr helped legitimize a young politico-religious community in its own early relations of rule, and defined lasting standards for conduct in warfare. 8 Many scholars see an early Islamic footprint in the very idea of international law, its emphasis on treaties, and IHL. 9 If the compatibility thesis is well-known, 10 less explored are Islamic contributions to the shared history of public international law, modern Muslim leadership in IHL, 11 and the too-rarely-treated role of Muslim states in the early Geneva and Hague diplomatic conferences. In fact, when we think of the 1949 Geneva conference, convened to update existing Hague and Geneva law, rarely do attendees from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Albania spring to mind. Not only did delegates from these Muslimmajority states take part in deliberations, they signed the resulting agreements known as the revised Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, including the unprecedented Fourth Convention covering civilians in war. 12 It is worth noticing several features of this contribution. Firstly, and empirically, one sees an increase over time (see below) in Muslim state conference participation, a trend that continues until the 1960s, after which many states-partly through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation-begin to develop culturally-specific interpretations of international law with complex motives and results.
Secondly, an emphasis is placed on "humanity" as a collective project by Conference participants in keeping with the IHL framework. Less noted, though important-in light of TWAIL critiques of empire-is how often such humanitarian priorities emerge from an expressly imperial framework and its philosophy of largesse, notably by Persian and Turkish representatives (both coming from empires).
Two examples bundle these points: Note the following declaration by General Mirza Khan, the first delegate of Persia to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference:
The Russian Government having done Persia the honor of inviting it . . . and His Imperial Majesty the Shah, my august sovereign, having deigned to choose me to undertake this honorable mission. . . . All these marks of interest impose upon me the duty of adding also on my side . . . support of the great cause which is that of all humanity and with which we have here to deal. 13 To refute critics who detect arrogance in the Emperor of Russia's initiative, Khan relays this story: "Its glance is like that of a king who causes his army to pass before him." The young Emperor, an autocrat of 26 years of age, who, for the first time, after his accession to the throne, was passing in review a brilliant army of 30,000 men, did not, in that moment of legitimate pride, forget an accident . . . to a stranger. . . . He who acts thus can not be selfish, and . . . the initiative that he has taken for this Conference, can only proceed from a . . . noble heart. Gentlemen, let us fulfil our duty before the civilized world, and not discourage Their Majesties. 1415 At the end of the 1907 Conference, the Turkish first delegate Turkhan Pasha echoed Khan's support for the peace endeavor, shared humanitarianism, and commitment to resulting norms: "My Government has given its full and entire adhesion to the humanitarian principles laid down by the Geneva Convention of 1864." 16 Pasha also emphasized a third element, deference to his government as a means to reiterate the core legal principle of noninterference:
The Turkish delegation, considering that the work of this Conference has been a work of high loyalty and humanity, destined solely to assure general peace by safeguarding the interests and the rights of each one, declares, in the name of its Government, that it adheres to the project . . . on the following conditions: (1) It is formally understood that recourse to . . . commissions of inquiry and arbitration, is purely facultative and could not . . . assume an obligatory character or degenerate into intervention; (2) The Imperial Government itself will be the judge of the cases where its interests would permit it to admit these methods without its abstention or refusal . . . being considered by the signatory States as an unfriendly act. 17 This third theme of equal respect for sovereignty also draws a firm line between permissible scrutiny of international-but not domestic-state use-of-force behavior. As Pasha notes: "It goes without saying that in no case shall the means in question be applied to matters of a domestic nature." 18 Humanitarianism embedded in state sovereignty is often missed in contemporary international law discussions, including those on Muslim state behavior. 19 Fourthly, within this discourse of reciprocity and civility, distinctive traditions of culture and religion are emphasized, but again in ways that support the general IHL project, as when Pasha raises the Red Crescent at the 1907 Hague Conferences: 14 [My Government] has, like the other Powers, rendered respect to Switzerland by the recognition of the hospital flag formed by the interversion of the Federal colors, but it has believed it necessary . . . to use the Red Crescent upon a white background for its military ambulances. 20 Governments at the conference, he explained, "have been kind enough to accept the principle of the reciprocal recognition of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent as distinctive emblems of hospital ships." 21 Likewise, Secretary General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Noury Bey, declared: "whenever Turkish relief ships have to perform their mission, the emblem of the Red Cross will be replaced . . . by the Red Crescent." 22 In response to Persian delegate Khan's request for explanation, the committee noted that the expression "institutions dedicated to religion" thus "applies to all institutions of that kind, churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, etc., without any discrimination between the diverse forms of worship"-a point "already affirmed at Brussels in 1874." 23 Lastly, in addition to religious and cultural matters, delegates exhibited moral, as well as legal innovation and leadership, using eloquence and logical reasoning. In 1899 Pasha successfully proposed amending Article 46 to hasten postconflict transition:
At the proposition of his Excellency Turkhan Pasha, it is decided to word the second paragraph as follows: "They must take into account the rules of military honor." The President observes . . . [this] affords some guaranty to the conquered party that humiliating conditions will not be imposed on him. Article 46 thus amended is adopted. 24 In keeping with the military expertise structurally embedded in IHL, many delegates were experienced military professionals, including General Khan of Persia; Abdullah Pasha, Division General on the staff of the Military House of the Sultan; and Mehemed Pasha, Rear Admiral. 25 Military honor was something wellestablished and specific: the internalized codes of behavior-considered virtues-afforded even enemies in defeat. 26 Such notions of honor inform the moral reasoning behind Turkhan Pasha's practical recommendation.
Moreover, Persian delegate Khan extends the moral bonds of military honor to statesmanship in general, offering this insight on vinculum juris, "the bond of law," what we might call today "norm compliance": His Excellency admits . . . the obligatory character of the Convention is not very pronounced and that the vinculum iuris may be broken without difficulty. But the nations of the world do not allow themselves to be guided solely by legal conceptions . . . and the Convention, weak as it may be from a legal standpoint, will nevertheless be of great moral value as the expression of the conscience of the civilized world. 27 Vol. 109
Convention under preparation." 28 Yet he seeks to persuade fellow delegates to join the Convention with this reasoning:
[T]he advantages of a world-wide arbitration Convention are so great and the guarantee that it will give to the world at large is so considerable, that it is the duty of the Conference to brave the obstacles . . . and to leave to our successors . . . the task of filling the gaps. 29 Again, the bedrock appeal to humanitarianism and sovereignty help him make the case: "The great merit of this Conference in the eyes of the world . . . is that all national consciences are equal in it, and that each of the States which we here represent has a right to its share of justice and of truth." He continues:
We know that, unfortunately, this great cause will not triumph between to-day and to-morrow; but that is an additional reason why its defenders should show themselves persevering and faithful. . . . As for me . . . I bring, in the name of my Government, one stone for an edifice, the foundations of which were dug by our predecessors, who have the gratitude of all mankind, without regard to country, continent, or race. It is merely a question now of building little by little, until our successors can celebrate the glorious completion. 30 Khan's successors are, of course, "us"-today's legal scholars, practitioners, military professionals, diplomats, and others engaged in global governance-in this open, generous, and tacit dialogue Khan begins with the future.
Among many other indicators of Muslim state leadership in this generative moment in international law, it is worth underscoring one of the strongest motifs that drives Conference participants-building normsespecially as it contrasts so emphatically with the mood of today: eroding norms, stressed systems of international order, and wilting resolve against efforts to undercut the architecture itself (i.e. lawfare). For this reason, among others, it is critical to revisit these early debates in the life of the law and to press for more nuanced accounts of diverse state actors in that process.
This essay has assumed the changing phases of TWAIL discourse, albeit with attention to the limits of "third-worldist" conceptions of opposition, skepticism toward discursive purity, and appreciation of the dangers of political advocacy in scholarship. It is, however, important to reiterate that examining the contributions of Muslim states and other non-Western contributions to public international law is by no means to weaken the need for TWAIL perspectives in legal scholarship. On the contrary, the goal is to strengthen the account of the role of law in contemporary global dynamics, while underscoring its multicultural pedigree and the ongoing, central role that states play in international norm making. 31 
